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I. INTRODUCTION
The American system of justice, in conjunction with the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, 34 1 protects a suspect from
incriminating himself. This protection has expanded beyond trial
applications and into settings involving governmental authority. In the
last half of this century, protection from self incrimination has been
recognized in grand jury hearings, 342 trials relative to government
employment, 343 and custodial interrogations. 344 American courts recognize
that a person may not be subjected to an inquisition in which the evidence
against him is obtained from a compelled confession. The evidence to
convict should be discovered through an investigation carried out by the
police and the executive branch of the government. 345 A confession is not
to be ignored because it is a particularly pleasing piece of evidence, 346 but
a confession or evidence from a suspect should be voluntarily given and
never compelled. This belief is the foundation of the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, which required that a
suspect be aware
of his right to remain silent in the face of police
347
interrogation.
In Miranda,348 the Court constructed a procedure through which it
could be determined whether a suspect was aware of certain Fifth and
Sixth Amendment rights. The rights the Miranda court sought to protect
were the right against compelled self-incrimination protected by the Fifth
Amendment. 349 The reading of Miranda rights does not, however,
establish that a confession in a custodial interrogation is voluntary. 350 A
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challenge to the voluntariness of a confession must still be adjudicated on
a case by case basis. 35 1 By contrast, the lack of Miranda warnings results
in an irrebuttable presumption that a confession by a suspect in custody
was compelled.352
With the announcement of the Miranda decision, concern arose that
the police would be hampered in their efforts to arrest and convict
criminals. 353 Miranda applied to all trials that commenced after the
decision was handed down. 354 Congress reacted to these concerns by
passing, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 in the 1968 Omnibus Crime Act, which defined
a test for determining whether a confession obtained
from a suspect met
355
the Fifth Amendment standard for voluntariness.
Prior to Miranda, the admissibility of a confession was determined
under a common law test of voluntariness. 356 This criterion required
adjudication of every confession where compulsion was claimed. In
Miranda, the Court took a detailed look at the practices employed by
police in obtaining confessions and information from suspects and then
evaluated the various tests used to determine if such confessions were
voluntary. 35735 As a result, a bright line test was created.358 Unless a
suspect is read his rights and he effectively (knowingly and intelligently)
waives those rights, there is a presumption that the custodial interrogation
is coercive. 359 This presumption can be rebutted on a case-by-case basis
in cases of actual compulsion. 360 For example, police are still prevented
from physically inducing confessions and from making false promises to
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suspects. Psychological trickery
and verbal pressure, however, are allowed
36 1
confessions.
obtaining
in
With the passage of 18 U.S.C. §3501, Congress declared that a five
part balancing test must be used in determining whether a confession is
voluntary. 362 The trial judge must consider all the circumstances
surrounding the confession including (1) the timing of the confession in
relation to the arrest and arraignment, (2) whether the suspect knew the
nature of the offense he was charges with, (3) whether the was advised or
knew that he did not have to make a statement and that any statement
could be used against him, (4) whether the suspect was advised of his right
to counsel; and (5) whether the suspect had counsel present when he was
questioned and when he made the confession. 36 3 If the judge finds a
confession to be voluntary, as defined by §3501, the confession or
information is heard by the jury. The jury is instructed
to give the
364
deserves.
it
feel
they
weight
the
confession or evidence
This federal law has rarely been used by the executive branch of the
federal government, 365 and only in a few instances has it been addressed
by the courts when not raised by the parties themselves. 36 6 Dickerson v.
United States367 is one such case where the Fourth Circuit considered
§3501 sua sponte and applied the statute in the absence of Miranda
warnings.
This action by the Fourth Circuit raises four issues which will be
addressed in this paper. Part I addresses the issue of whether the federal
executive branch can decline to enforce a law passed by Congress will be
examined, as well as the related question of whether, in the face of
executive refusal to use a law, can the courts sua sponte rely on that law to
decide a case. In Part 11 the Miranda rule will be examined to determine if
it is only a prophylactic rule that is not constitutionally required. Part III is
a discussion and examination of the character of the Miranda rule and the
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comment made by Judge Michael in Dickerson concerning the
applicability of a prophylactic rule to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 368 An attempt will be made to analyze what the effect would
be if the U.S. Supreme Court upholds §3501 in Part IV.
II. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT TO CONTRESS "NO THANKS!"
From the time of its passage in the Johnson administration, §3501 has
rarely been used by the Justice Department to salvage a confession which
suffered from a Miranda deficiency. The Tenth Circuit considered §3501
in 1975 and found that the statute was valid. But the Tenth Circuit also
held that if the terms of the statute were complied with there was 369
no
requirement for compliance with Miranda in United States v Crocker.
Since 1975, the Justice Department has not attempted to use §3501 in a
federal appeals court or before the United States Supreme Court. 37" Even
though the statute has been argued in amicus briefs, 371 the Justice

Department has circumvented judicial consideration of the statute by
dismissing the indictments or by withdrawing briefs
that rely on §3501
372
and resubmitting briefs that rely on other factors.
The executive branch of the federal government apparently believes
§3501 to be unconstitutional. Most recently, Attorney General Janet Reno
informed Congress that the Justice Department would not be defending
the constitutionality of §3501. 373 Title Two of the U.S.C. 288k(b)
provides that the Attorney General or the Solicitor General must notify
Congress in a timely manner of any court decision affecting the
constitutionality of a law where the Attorney General does not intend to
appeal.374 However, the statute does not provide a mechanism for
requiring the Justice Department to inform Congress that it will not
enforce a law passed by Congress.
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The executive branch is charged with the responsibility to "take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed. 3 75 While responsibility for creating
the laws is vested in Congress, executive oversight is provided by the
President's veto power. Once a law is passed and signed by the President
or passed over his objection, it is the law of the land and is no longer
subject to executive review.
Laws exist at all levels of government that are rarely enforced and
some laws that are regularly enforced are not always enforced.
Prosecutors have the freedom to determine which cases will be prosecuted
and under what circumstances no charges will be brought or charges will
be dismissed.376 These decisions are made in good faith based upon the
strength of the evidence, the judicial and prosecutorial resources available,
and the nature of the violation. But, prosecutorial discretion to pursue a
case is inherently different from refusing to apply a law passed by
Congress that would aid the prosecution of people who violate the law.
As Justice Scalia noted in Davis v. United States, "once a prosecution has
been commenced and a confession introduced, the Executive assuredly
has neither the power or the right to determine
what objections to
377
law."
valid
are
confession
the
of
admissibility
The Justice Department has indicated that the law is unconstitutional,
and therefore, will not be used to appeal cases claiming Miranda
violations. 37 8 But the authority to declare a law unconstitutional does not
rest with the executive branch of the government. With the decision 379
in
Marbury v. Madison, that authority was taken by the judicial system.
The courts are now left with a valid law which the Justice Department will
not argue in court, yet is raised in amicus briefs and, on occasion, by the
3 81

judiciary itself.380 The Fourth Circuit, in Dickerson v. United States,

considered §3501 although the government resubmitted a brief that did not
include an argument based on §3501. 382 The Justice Department appears
to have overstepped its constitutional mandate by picking and choosing
which laws it will invoke and enforce. The Justice Department has
claimed law making duties by acting as the arbiter of the constitutionality
of laws validly passed by Congress.
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376
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III. THE CONSIDERATION OF § 3501 SUA SPONTE
Courts historically have been reluctant to consider issues not argued
by the parties to decide cases. 38 3 They typically rely on the parties before
them to bring all pertinent issues and law to their attention. However, the
court cannot ignore significant legal issues that the parties neglect to being
to the court's attention: "[T]he proper administration of the criminal law
cannot be left to the stipulation of the parties." 384 In Young v. United
States,385 the United States Supreme Court responded sua sponte to a
confession of error by the government in a case interpreting the Harrison
Narcotics Act. 386 In a case where the validity of a controlling federal
statue was questioned by reason of inadvertent repeal by Congress, United
States National Bank of Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents of
America,387 the Court held that "when an issue or claim is properly before
the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories advanced
by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to identify and
apply the proper construction of governing law." 388 In Carlisle v. United
States,389 Justice Scalia wrote a majority decision overruling an acquittal
granted outside the terms of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
stating that "[f]ederal courts have no more discretion to disregard the
Rule's mandate than they do to disregard constitutional or statutory
provisions. ' 390 Justice Stevens, dissenting in the same case, quoted Judge
Learned Hand, stating "[a] judge, at least in a federal court, is more than a
moderator; he is affirmatively charged with securing 391
a fair trial and he
must intervene sua sponte to that end, when necessary."
Therefore, despite judicial reluctance to consider issues sua sponte, the
precedent for a court to take such action on its own initiative is clear.
Without a finding by a higher court that a law is unconstitutional, a court,
in the interest of coherence and equity, should apply a law it considers
valid to the matters before it. In Dickerson, Judge Williams considered
the facts surrounding the confession made by Dickerson and the district
court's finding that the confession was voluntary and then applied a valid
92 The court held that the confession was
federal statute, 18 USC §3501. 392
383 Young
384
3 85
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admissible 393 under 18 USC §3501, despite the Justice Department's
withdrawal of a brief that relied on the statute 394 and re-submission of a
brief that made no mention of the statute. 395 The Fourth Circuit even
noted that "[t]he United States Department of Justice took the unusual step
of actually prohibiting the U.S. Attorney's Office from briefing the
issue." 396 Regardless of the stand taken by the Department of Justice, the
Fourth Circuit considered §3501, 397 claiming to be "a court of law and not
of politics." 398 Judge Williams found that the "question of whether §3501

governs the admissibility of confessions in federal court is squarely before
us today" and the "Department of Justice cannot prevent us from deciding
this case under the governing law simply by refusing to argue it." 399 After

reviewing the history of §3501 before the Fourth Circuit, Judge Williams
held that "[a]gainst this background, the Government's failure to raise the
applicability of §3501 on appeal in this case does not come as a surprise.
Of even greater importance, neither 4does
it prevent us from considering
00
appeal.
on
§3501
of
the applicability
In a constitutional scheme that relies on checks and balances between
the three branches of government and a division of authority and
discretion as to the enactment of laws, the enforcement and interpretation
of the law would in certain instances require sua sponte consideration of
laws. There is no question that 18 U.S.C. §3501 was passed by both the
House of Representatives and the Senate and signed into law by President
Johnson on June 19, 1968. 401 It is the failure of the executive branch to
use this statute, which broadens their law enforcement abilities, that
troubles the courts. 402 The courts are correct in their assessment that the
judicial branch is charged with determining the constitutionality of a
statute and, in the absence of a finding that a statute violates the United
States Constitution, applying it to federal cases.
Dickerson has been appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and
the issue may be laid to rest in the 1999-2000 term. 40 3 Justice Scalia
discussed §3501 at length in his concurring opinion in Davis.4 4 Although
See id. at 695.
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404

the Supreme Court declined to apply §3501(c) to a suspect arrested on
state charges in United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez,40 5 the Court did not
challenge the applicability of §3501 to federal cases. The disturbing
quality of the Justice Department's non-implementation of §3501 is that it
blurs the constitutional duties of the legislative, executive and judicial
branches. The Justice Department is usurping the law making powers of
Congress when it, on its own volition, determines a law to be
unconstitutional and , without direction from the Judicial Branch, ignores
the laws of the elected representatives of the people. Therefore, under this
analysis, the courts are fulfilling their constitutional obligation by
considering §3501 sua sponte.
IV. MIRANDA: CONSTITUTIONALLY REQUIRED OR
PROPHYLACTIC RULE?
Judge Michael, in his split opinion in Dickerson, wonders whether
Miranda is a constitutional rule: "[t]he majority holds that §3501 governs
the admissibility of confessions in federal court because Miranda is not a
constitutional rule ....
If Miranda is not a constitutional rule, why does
the Supreme Court continue to apply it in prosecutions arising in state
courts?, 40 6 Rather than deciding the §3501 issue, Judge Michael would
leave the investigation of the executive's refusal to implement §3501 to
Congress through use of its public hearing process. 40 7 But his comment
leaves many questions open regarding the breadth of the Miranda
warnings. Can the requirements of the Fifth Amendment be met without
"Mirandizing" a suspect in custody? Are Miranda warnings just one way
of satisfying a suspect's rights? Does the Fifth Amendment require that a
defendant's statements be voluntary or that they be warned? Courts have
looked at this distinction and, as early as the Miranda decision itself, the
Miranda warnings were seen as only one method for guaranteeing
suspects their Constitutional rights. "Therefore, we cannot say that the
Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solution ....
Our decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which '4will
08
handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect."
Eight years after specifying the Miranda warnings, the Court in
Michigan v. Tucker 4 09 started backpedaling on the status, if not the
requirements, of Miranda. Tucker had been convicted after a witness
testified to his involvement in a rape.410 The witness had been located
after Tucker made a statement that was not subject to sufficient warning as
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to the availability of counsel. 4 11 Applying the Court's decision in Johnson
v. New Jersey,4 ' 2 Tucker's statement could not be used in the prosecutor's
case in chief since his trial commenced after the decision in Miranda was
announced.4 ' 3 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated
"[t]he Court recognized that these procedural safeguards were not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures
to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was
protected.",414 Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to note that "[t]his Court
said in Miranda that statements taken in violation of the Miranda
principles must not be used to prove the prosecutor's case at trial."' 5
Michigan v. Tucker decided the issue of whether the exclusionary rule as
applied to the Fourth Amendment extended to violation of Miranda and
the use of evidence derived from un-Mirandized statements. The
exclusionary rule, as decided in Wong Sun v United States,4 16 held that
"fruits of police conduct which actually infringed a defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights must be suppressed.",4 17 If a Miranda violation
infringed a constitutional right, then no evidence obtained in that
statement nor found as a result of that statement could be used in the
prosecutor's case. The Court looked at the issue in a two part analysis:
"We will therefore first consider whether the police conduct complained
of directly infringed upon respondent's right against compulsory selfincrimination or whether it instead violated only the prophylactic rules
developed to protect the right.",4 18 The Court allowed the witness
discovered from the defendant's un-Mirandized statements to give
testimony at trial but excluded the un-Mirandized statements as
evidence. 419 The faulty warnings were a Miranda violation, not a
constitutional violation.
Miranda warnings have a place in the protection of a suspect's right
against self- incrimination, but they do not appear to occupy the entire
field. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in New York v. Quarles,420 writing again for
the majority, stated that, "the prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore are
'not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead
measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is]
protected.' ''42 1 Quarles made an un-Mirandized statement to the arresting
officers about the location of a gun he had hidden in the store that was the
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421Id.

sight of his arrest. 422 The Court carved out a public safety exception to the
requirements of Mirandaallowing the admission of the42statement
made by
3
Quarles about the location of the gun and the gun itself.
A year later Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in Oregon v.
Elstad,424 noted that "[t]he Miranda exclusionary rule, however, serves the
Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment
itself. It may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment
violation." 425 In differentiating Miranda protections from Fifth
Amendment protections, Justice O'Connor noted, "Miranda'spreventive
medicine provides a remedy even to the defendant who has suffered no
identifiable constitutional harm." 426 Elstad made statements to the police
7
in his home prior to his arrest and prior to receiving Miranda warnings.
He later repeated the statements and made a full confession to the police
after his arrest and during an interrogation at the police station. 428 The
Court was unwilling to cast the second confession as coerced under the
theory that the first confession "let the cat out of the bag" and Elstad's free
will was impaired by this previous defect. 429 The Court looked to the
voluntariness of the second confession, but not to the absence of warnings
before the first.
These four cases define the scope of the Miranda requirements by:
precluding the use of an un-Mirandized statement in the prosecutor's case
in chief,4 30 establishing a public safety exception, 43 1 admitting physical
4 32
evidence and witnesses discovered through un-Mirandized statements,
and allowing admission of warned statements that were preceded by unMirandized statements. 433 What these cases do not do is define Miranda
warnings as constitutionally required. The language in Miranda clearly
states, "we encourage Congress and the states to continue their laudable
search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of
422
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Id. at 657.
424
Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
425
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4 26
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Miranda warnings to impeach the defendant whose testimony is inconsistent with the
unwarned statement was established in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)(quoting
Wlader v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)).
431 Quarles,467 U.S. at 657.
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Tucker decision applied to both witnesses and physical evidence, stating " We believe
that [Tucker's] reasoning applies with equal force when the fruit of a noncoercive
Miranda violation is neither a witness or an article of evidence but the accused's own
testimony." 467 U.S. at 308.
433 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318.

individuals while promoting effective enforcement of our criminal
laws. '434 Arguably §3501 does this by incorporating the content of
Miranda warnings into a five part test that examines the 4constitutional
35
protection against self-incrimination and the right to counsel.
The Court has restricted Miranda by drawing perimeters around its
edges but has not touched the depth of the decision. Although Miranda is
broader than the constitutional guarantee, it is applied to proceedings in
state matters. 4 36 The four cases above were all criminal matters before
state courts, but the Supreme Court did not address the applicability of
Miranda to the states in these cases. States have adopted Miranda's
requirements as a bright line rule for determining compliance with the
Fifth and Sixth Amendment requirements. However, Miranda left open
437
the opportunity for the states to protect these rights in another fashion.
No state has adopted alternative procedures, even though they were
invited to by Chief Justice Warren.4 38 In their article evaluating the effect
of Miranda on law enforcement, Professors Paul Cassel and Richard
Fowles suggest videotaping interrogations as an alternative to Miranda,
questioning suspects in the presence of a magistrate or returning to the
pre-Miranda voluntariness test.4 39 The only state to attempt an alternative
to Miranda is Arizona, which adopted a statute similar to 18 U.S.C.
§3501.440 Like the United States Department of Justice, Arizona relies on
Miranda and does not invoke the statute to determine the admissibility of
defendant's statements. Chief Justice Warren's invitation remains
unanswered, and Judge Michael's observation that the Supreme Court is
applying a rule not constitutionally required is not raised by the states in
challenges to state convictions. Thus, although no state has effectively
written a rule or instituted a procedure that would replace Miranda, Judge
Michael's question about how a rule of law created by the Court to address
a constitutional deficiency can be binding on the states even though it is
not constitutionally mandated, has been left unanswered.
In trying to answer Judge Michael, we can look to Justice Warren's
decision in Malloy v. Hogan.44 1 The Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination was made applicable to the states through the due
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441 Malloy, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
440

process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in Malloy.442 In that case, a
convicted gambler, when called upon to testify at state gambling inquiry,
refused to testify by invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege. 443 The
defendant was subsequently jailed. The Supreme Court held that "[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege
that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal infringement."
Chief Justice Warren in Miranda applied the Malloy holding to require
Miranda warnings in state and local investigations just as "the substantive
standards underlying the privilege applied with full force to state court
proceedings. 445
The answer to Judge Michael's question lies within the
characterization of the Miranda protections either as constitutionally
required and within the Fifth Amendment protection against selfincrimination, or as a rule of law that cannot be forced on the state
governments by the federal judiciary. In a footnote Judge Williams
recognizes this as "an interesting academic question" but says it has "no
bearing on our conclusion that
Miranda's conclusive presumption is not
446
required by the Constitution."
However, whether Miranda's protections are constitutionally required
is the crux of the issue as to whether it is applicable to the states. The
justices dissenting in Miranda did not find the warnings to be
constitutionally required, stating, "[t]he Court appears similarly wrong in
thinking that precise knowledge of one's rights is a settled prerequisite
under the Fifth Amendment to the loss of its protections."' 447 This thought
has been repeated by the characterization of the Miranda requirements as a
prophylactic rule. 448 Until there is a case challenged by a state on the
grounds that Miranda's rule cannot be applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment because it exceeds the Fifth Amendment
requirements protecting a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination,
Judge Michael's question will remain as Judge Williams described it academic.
V. DICKERSON AS DECIDED BY THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT
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If the Supreme Court grants certiorari 449 and hears Mr. Dickerson's
appeal, the Court's opinion will most likely not address all the issues
raised in the Fourth Circuit decision. "It is not the habit of the court to
decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a
decision in the case." 450 In order to uphold the Fourth Circuit, the Court
will have to reconcile their repeated findings that compliance with
Miranda is not constitutionally required, with their holding in City of
Boerne v. Flores45 1 that Congress does not have the authority to pass a
statute that supersedes a Supreme Court decision construing the
Constitution. 4 52 However, if the Court finds that Miranda is required by
the Constitution, then Congress lacked the authority to pass §3501. If
Miranda is only a prophylactic measure that presents only one method for
satisfying the Fifth Amendment protection from self-incrimination, then it
may not be protected under the City of Boerne decision.
If, however, the Court can cast its decision on some narrower ground,
the issue may be avoided. There is good reason for avoiding a finding that
Miranda is not constitutionally required and can be superceded by
Congress. Under the auspices of Miranda, courts have a bright line rule,
with just a handful of exceptions for determining the admissibility of
statements made by suspects under arrest. 453 If the law reverts back to a
test of voluntariness, the Miranda rebuttable presumption of voluntariness
will have to be replaced by another mechanism for determining
voluntariness. 454 Furthermore, §3501 is applicable only in federal cases
and therefore could not fill the gap left in the state courts. 4 55 The Miranda
warnings, that even school children know from exposure to television
police dramas, are regularly given by officers. Police and sheriffs
departments have printed waiver forms that make compliance a
routine. 456 To establish a new rule outside the procedures of Mirandathat
would give the same consistency of results would be monumental task.
The application of a balancing test like §3501 would allow states and
localities to continue to "Mirandize" suspects and protect statements from
voluntariness challenges in non-coercive situations. Although opponents
of Miranda argue that it has contributed many cases to the annals of
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unsolved or unpunished, crime,457 substituting a balancing test that
incorporates Miranda warnings as indicators of voluntariness may not
effect more than a few cases with Dickerson's unusual fact pattern. A
United States Supreme Court finding that §3501 is constitutional would
probably not result in the suspension of Miranda warnings by law
enforcement personnel. The presumption that such warnings protect the
suspect from coercive custodial interrogation would remain.
VI. CONCLUSION
With Dickerson, Judge Williams has brought the Justice Department's
policy of ignoring the existence of 18 U.S.C. §3501 to the forefront.
However, the consideration of §3501 sua sponte, the narrow fact pattern
to which she applied the ruling, and the presence of Miranda, like
components in the balancing test presented by §3501, combine to make
the effect of the Fourth Circuit decision uncertain. With a petition of
certiorari pending before the United States Supreme Court, 458 law
enforcement personnel and the legal community can only rely on their
present procedures.
A dramatic change in the procedures required by Miranda and a
substitution of hearings to determine voluntariness under the Fifth
Amendment, in either the federal system or state proceedings, will create a
burden that the court systems may be ill equipped to handle. Although all
confessions are subject to review for voluntariness, the loss of a bright line
rule giving a rebuttable presumption that a confession was not coerced,
would require more judicial time to weight the elements of a balancing
test. A compromise should be made between a balancing test, allowing
voluntary confessions despite defective warnings, and a bright line test,
presuming voluntariness in the absence of coercion. If certain standards
are met, this compromise would meet the objective of the Warren court to
protect suspects from inadvertently surrendering their constitutional rights
and could prevent obvious miscarriages of justice. The end result would
be that truthful confessions would no longer be excluded for technical
violations that are not indicative of involuntariness.
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